An accidental release of butadiene and benzene from the ethane cracking unit ignited into a fire; the CSB opened a root-cause investigation that is still underway, with no final report yet issued.
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CSB oil & gas incident catalog
Every route on the map ends at a refinery or a gas plant, and each one runs on the same kind of industrial controls—valves, pressure, temperature held inside a safe band. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board exists to investigate the moment that band is crossed by accident, and its case files read as a catalog of what a refinery looks like the day after. A corroded pipe opens those valves by failure. A stranger on a public network can open them on command.
Each filled triangle is a closed CSB investigation at a refinery, gas plant, or terminal; a hollow ring marks one still open. Purple = workers killed, gold = none; size scales with the death toll. Click a marker for the report.
From the CSB case files
Images: U.S. Chemical Safety Board investigation files (public domain). Each photo links to its CSB report.
The catalog
An accidental release of butadiene and benzene from the ethane cracking unit ignited into a fire; the CSB opened a root-cause investigation that is still underway, with no final report yet issued.
CSB investigation ↗An isomerization-unit startup overfilled and overheated a tower; hydrocarbon vented from a blowdown stack, formed a vapor cloud, and ignited in explosions that killed 15 and injured about 180.
CSB investigation ↗A heat exchanger in the catalytic reformer unit ruptured from High Temperature Hydrogen Attack, releasing hydrogen and naphtha above 500°F that ignited and fatally injured seven workers.
CSB investigation ↗Workers replacing corroded piping on a 150-foot crude fractionator while it was still running released naphtha onto the hot tower, igniting a fire that killed four and seriously injured a fifth.
CSB investigation ↗About 27,000 lb of hydrogen sulfide released when contract workers opened the wrong, mislabeled flange during maintenance, killing two and sending 13 others to hospitals.
CSB investigation ↗Operators routed liquid naphtha into a pressurized fuel-gas vessel built for vapor, overfilling it; the release formed a vapor cloud that ignited in a flash fire and killed two brothers working for BP.
CSB investigation ↗Two contract workers died of nitrogen asphyxiation in the hydrocracker unit after one fell into a vessel being purged with nitrogen and a second was overcome trying to rescue him.
CSB investigation ↗During startup of a renewable-diesel hydroprocessing unit, a tube in a fired heater ruptured and released renewable diesel and hydrogen, sparking a fire that seriously burned one employee.
CSB investigation ↗A corroded pipe elbow in the Girard Point HF alkylation unit ruptured, releasing hydrocarbons and about 5,000 lb of hydrofluoric acid that ignited in three explosions; the refinery never reopened.
CSB investigation ↗A failed circulation pump on a naphtha tank released vapors for about 30 minutes before they ignited; the fire spread to 14 other tanks, burned for three days, and caused over $150 million in damage.
CSB investigation ↗An explosion in the fluid catalytic cracking unit released about 39,000 lb of flammable vapor and was followed by a large asphalt fire, injuring 36; the blast threw debris that narrowly missed a tank of hydrogen fluoride.
CSB investigation ↗Operators dismantled a plug valve in the sulfuric-acid alkylation unit while it was still under pressure, releasing about 2,000 lb of isobutane that formed a vapor cloud and ignited.
CSB investigation ↗A failed slide valve in the fluid catalytic cracking unit let hydrocarbons backflow and ignite in the electrostatic precipitator; the explosion scattered catalyst dust up to a mile away, narrowly missing a tank of modified hydrofluoric acid.
CSB investigation ↗A sulfuric-acid release at the alkylation unit, from an inadequately tightened sampling fitting, burned two workers and released an estimated 84,000 lb of acid.
CSB investigation ↗A carbon-steel pipe in the #4 Crude Unit ruptured from sulfidation corrosion, releasing hot gas oil that formed a vapor cloud and ignited; 19 workers escaped and thousands of nearby residents sought medical care.
CSB investigation ↗A 10-inch pipe ruptured from sulfidation corrosion and released hydrogen that exploded, damaging about 100 nearby homes; the same investigation covers a January flash fire that seriously burned four workers.
CSB investigation ↗A control-valve failure caused violent shaking in the HF alkylation unit's recycle piping, breaking pipe connections and releasing hydrocarbons and hydrogen fluoride that ignited into a multi-day fire.
CSB investigation ↗Liquid propane released from a freeze-cracked, out-of-service dead-leg of piping formed a vapor cloud that ignited into a massive fire in the propane deasphalting unit, injuring four.
CSB investigation ↗Gasoline components were released and ignited while workers removed a malfunctioning pump from the HF alkylation unit, seriously injuring six employees.
CSB investigation ↗3 more oil & gas CSB sites are documented but not plotted—no citable facility coordinate yet, and a wrong pin is worse than none: Caribbean Petroleum (CAPECO) Tank Terminal (PR); Third Coast Industries Petroleum Products Facility (TX); Enterprise Pascagoula Gas Processing Plant (MS).
Source: U.S. Chemical Safety Board investigations (csb.gov). Coordinates traced to EPA Facility Registry Service records or facility addresses; petrochemical and non-petroleum cases are excluded. Every figure links to its CSB report—verify before acting.
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